sajm






Stability in the Boardroom: Decoding Attendance Drivers for Independent and Executive Directors in India

Srikanth Potharla*

DOI: https://doi.org/10.62206/sajm.31.4.2024.155-180

PUBLISHED :13 FEB 2025

Abstract

Understanding board dynamics is essential in the rapidly evolving corporate governance landscape, particularly in emerging markets like India. The Board Attendance Consistency Indicator (BACI), reflecting director commitment and governance quality, plays a central role in this study. Analyzing attendance across independent (BACI_IND) and executive directors (BACI_ED), this research draws on 3,742 listed companies, with 17,071 firm- year observations from 2010 to 2022. Employing panel data regression addresses endogeneity through lagged variables, while robustness is tested using Heteroskedasticity Consistent Standard Errors (HCSE) and industry-fixed effects. Findings show that higher board independence negatively affects attendance consistency for independent directors but positively impacts executive directors, who may attend more consistently to safeguard managerial interests. Larger boards show reduced attendance, underscoring coordination challenges, while institutional ownership strengthens BACI, highlighting the role of institutional oversight. These insights validate the relationships between board structure, ownership, and attendance, contributing to governance practices.

Key Words

Board attendance consistency, Board independence, Corporate governance, Emerging markets, Institutional ownership

Author Biography

Srikanth Potharla*
Assistant Professor, Department of Finance and Accounting, ICFAI Business School (IBS), A Constituent of IFHE, Deemed to Be University, Hyderabad, Telangana, India. E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it / This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

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